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Abstract When complete contracting is not possible, allocating control structure
becomes the second-best arrangement. This paper analyzes the design of optimal
divisional structure within an organization where ex post bargaining between the
potential divisional managers is possible. In much the same light as Aghion and Tirole
(J Political Econ 105(1):1–29, 1997), we study the control problem in the context of
search for projects. Our model shows that when the managers cannot bargain with
one another, internal integration is preferred to internal separation. Where bargaining
is possible, formal divisional structure defines both the ex post bargaining position of
the two managers and their incentive to search ex ante. When the managers tend to
arrive at a more favorable project to the principal via bargaining, the general leader
of a firm may want to choose separation instead to increase the probability of bargain-
ing, as the symmetrical incentive requires both managers to search and get informed.
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1 Introduction
Researchers in economics and business have long recognized the importance of orga-
nizational forms for the performance of teams, corporations, and economies. Milgrom
and Roberts (1992) document how the decentralization of General Motors in the
1920’s allowed it to surpass the more centralized Ford. Maskin et al. (2000) and Qian
et al. (1999) attribute the striking divergence in the post-transitional economic perfor-
mance for China and the former Soviet Union to the M-form (multidivisional form)
and U-form (unitary form) decision-making structures in their respective government
economic planning divisions.1
Rather than compare multidivisional and unitary organizational forms, this paper
takes an incomplete contract approach to the optimal decision between separate divi-
sions or integration in an M-form organization. There is a large body of existent
literature on divisional structure using the complete contract approach (Rotemberg
and Saloner 1993; Poitevin 1995; Maskin et al. 2000; Mookherjee 2006). The key
problem addressed in each of these papers is the way in which the chief of a firm can
write the optimal incentive contract for her division managers.
Our work studies the internal boundaries of the firm, namely the optimal deci-
sion between internal integration and separation within a firm. This follows the pat-
tern used by Grossman and Hart (1986) for the integration (separation) between two
firms when complete contracting is not feasible. Our model contains one general
leader of the firm (called the “principal”) and two divisional managers (called the
“agents”). The principal decides whether to have two separate divisions and make
each agent the head of his respective division, or integrate the divisions with only
one serving as the general manager. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), we also con-
sider ex post bargaining between the agents and its impact on their ex ante incentives.
We find that the agents do not take the principal’s well-being into account when they
bargain, and that the bargaining process can have a strong impact on the principal’s
optimal integration (separation) decision. One innovation in this paper is that we
highlight the interplay between optimal divisional structure and bargaining. Integra-
tion generates an asymmetrical incentive for the two agents and therefore reduces the
probability of bargaining, while separation generates greater symmetric incentive, and
increases the probability of bargaining. Therefore the principal will optimally prohibit
bargaining through the design of divisional structure if it generates worse outcomes
for her than in the case of no bargaining.
The main results of this paper are as follows: (1) when bargaining is not possible,
it is always better for the principal to adopt integration, and assign control rights to
the most productive agent; (2) when bargaining is possible, formal divisional structure
defines the ex post bargaining position of the two agents and their ex ante incentive to
search. The principal may want to adopt separation when the agents generally agree
with her on a more favorable project through bargaining. The reason is that both agents
1 In organization literature, M-form (multidivisional form) means that tasks are organized based on self-
contained divisions, such as an Oldsmobile division and a Chevrolet division in General Motors, and U-form
(unitary form) means tasks are organized based on functions or specializations, such as sales, marketing
and R&D departments.
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need to be informed in order to bargain, and therefore bargaining is more likely when
the two agents have symmetrical incentives (separation); while one agent’s incentive
to search will be undermined under integration.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 begins with a review of the relevant lit-
erature; Sect. 3 provides a motivating story; Sect. 4 presents the model setup; Sect. 5
discusses the benchmark case of a complete contract; Sect. 6 analyzes the model of an
incomplete contract without bargaining; Sect. 7 analyzes the model with an incomplete
contract and bargaining; and finally, Sect. 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our work is related to research comparing the efficiency of M-form and U-form orga-
nizations. Puschke (2009) points out that U-form organization enables cost savings
due to specialization of tasks. Therefore the principal’s choice of either M-form or
U-form depends on the complementarity and substitutability of functions performed
by the divisions (sales, accounting, marketing etc.). M-form is optimal when divisional
functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. This paper studies the
optimal separation-versus-integration decision in an M-form organization when the
divisions conduct very similar functions. Therefore the complementarity of functions
is not a concern in our paper.
Our work is also related to the complete contract literature on divisional struc-
ture, which can largely be subdivided into two categories: the communication models
(Argyres 1995; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Dessein 2002; Dessein and Santos
2006; van Zandt 1999), which mainly concern the tradeoffs between coordination (or
communication cost) and specialization (or local adaptation), and the incentive mod-
els (Maskin et al. 2000; Poitevin 1995; Rotemberg and Saloner 1993), which address
the incentive schemes for division managers. For a more detailed discussion of this
literature, Mookherjee (2006) provides an excellent survey.
The communication models generally assume that separation brings benefit to the
principal because it allows the agents to specialize, while integration reduces commu-
nication costs and enhances coordination. Where the benefit of specialization is more
significant, separation is more advantageous, and vice versa. The incentive models
usually consider different contracts between the CEO and divisional managers or the
working style of a CEO (democratic or autocratic) and its impact on the managers’
efforts. It is usually better for the principal to be more democratic and delegate more
autonomy to the divisional managers, which thus gives the managers greater incentive
to innovate. When the environment is not conducive to generating new ideas or inno-
vation is unprofitable for the firm, it is better for the principal to have a more autocratic
leadership style.
Our paper differs from both strands of literature as we abstract from the communi-
cation issue and the question of whether to delegate control. Rather, we investigate how
the general leader should optimally design control structure between two divisional
managers after the delegation decision has been made, specifically in the absence of
complete contracting.
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3 An illustrative story
We can illustrate the basic intuition behind our model through a situation commonly
found in any university’s school of economics. This logic can be applied to many
similar settings. Suppose that the dean of a school of economics is very busy, and
therefore must assign some decision-making power to the chair professors. There is
a chair professor of microeconomics and a chair of macroeconomics. The dean can
create one department of microeconomics and one of macroeconomics chaired by
each of them respectively (separation), or create one general department of economics
chaired by either one of them (integration). Each year, the school must recruit new
faculty members from the job market. There are many tasks that are associated with
this process, including searching for and evaluating candidates.
Let us suppose for a specific year, there are two vacancies in the school, and both
chairs select candidates from the same pool. Each chair prefers candidates from his
respective field, but he also prefers having a candidate from the other field to having no
candidate at all, because some faculty members from the other field can teach courses
for the whole school, regardless of their expertise. If the dean chooses separation,
each of the chairs will be able to select the position for his respective department.
If the dean chooses integration, the head of the entire department will be in charge
of both positions. The chairs must thus exert effort to search and become informed
about the candidates’ quality. The more effort they invest, the more likely they will
be to become informed. They will not make a choice by themselves when they are
uninformed because this increases the chances of selecting a poor candidate unable to
perform even basic jobs well. Therefore if neither party is informed, no candidate will
be chosen. If one professor is informed and the other is not, the informed professor
will propose (his preferred choice) to the uninformed one, and the uninformed one
will accept, because having the other’s favorite is better than having nobody. If both of
them are informed, the one in control can overrule the other or engage in bargaining.
For example, when the microeconomics professor is the department chair, and he finds
that there is a candidate who is very strong in microeconomics, but has little expertise
in macroeconomics, and another one who is slightly less competitive in microeco-
nomics but very strong in macroeconomics, he can propose to the macroeconomics
professor that he choose the second one for the position, and the macroeconomics
professor can offer some future reciprocal favors (e.g., agreeing to a greater allocation
of next year’s seminar budget to microeconomic topics, or becoming a member of
the micro professor’s PhD student’s committee). Here the candidate chosen from bar-
gaining may not be one of the original favorites of either professor, but is more likely
a good compromise. Generally speaking, the reward for searching is the increased
probability of becoming informed and therefore the increased probability of choosing
one’s favorite when in control. Therefore the more positions one is in charge of, other
things equal, the more motivated he is to exert search effort.
The dean does not know the specific information about the characteristics of the
candidates, but she still has rational expectations of the average quality of a candidate
chosen by either of the chairs, or by both of them jointly. When bargaining is not
taken into account, and her preference is more similar to the chair of micro (macro)
economics, she should always choose integration, and make the micro (macro) chair
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Table 1 Projects and payoffs
Project\payoff πP π1 π2
FP B β1b β2b
F1 α1 B b γ2b
F2 α2 B γ1b b
The columns are the situation in which the party’s favorite project is chosen. The rows are the party’s payoff
given the project chosen in the column
the department head. Thus the head will be inclined to select her most-preferred candi-
date. When bargaining is considered, the candidate chosen from bargaining is usually
a good compromise between the interests of the two chairs, but could be either better
or worse for the dean than the default choice of the chair in charge. When the candidate
chosen from bargaining is much better, separation might be an optimal arrangement,
because only in this way can the dean have both of the chairs equally incentivized to
search and become informed in order to bargain successfully.
4 The model setup
We now generalize and formalize the ideas in the above example. Our model contains
one principal P (addressed as “she”), who is not directly productive, and two agents,
A1 and A2 (we use “he” to address each of them). There might be two divisions D1
and D2 with N ≥ 3 projects for each division. For simplicity, we assume that the
distribution of projects for D1 and D2 is exactly the same. As in Aghion and Tirole
(1997) and Riyanto (2000), we introduce interest congruence among the players. Each
project n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } is associated with a profit Bn toP, and private benefit b1n
to A1, and b2n to A2. We assume some projects yield “sufficiently negative” payoffs,
so that an uninformed party will confess ignorance. When no project is chosen, each
party receives 0. Each can receive a payoff from both D1 and D2 (there are spillover
effects between the divisions).
The principal does not search, and agents search for information independently. By
exerting effort e which costs g(e), one agent can get fully informed with a probability
0 ≤ e ≤ 1. We assume g′(e) > 0, g′′(e) > 0.
For each division, each party has a potential “favorite” project. The favorite pro-
ject for P (denoted as FP ) gives her B, β1b to A1 and β2b to A2. The favorite of
agent Ai (denoted asFi ) gives this agent b, αi B to the principal and γ j b to agent A j
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j. We also assume that α1, α2, β1, β2, γ1, γ2 are between 0
and 1, and strictly smaller than 1. All parameters are common knowledge.2 We use
πP , π1, π2 to denote the payoff for the principal, agent 1 and agent 2. The information
of the interest congruence is also illustrated in Table 1.
The principal does not search, and only has to decide on the allocation of control.
She has to decide whether to have the two divisions controlled separately or jointly
by a general manager (illustrated in Fig. 1). The characteristics of the candidates are
2 This means that although P does not search, she still has a rough idea of what her payoff should be in
each case based on comparison with the performance level of the industry as a whole.
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Fig. 1 The Control Structures. The left one is the organization under separation of control. The middle one
is the case of integration with control rights assigned to A1, and the right one is the case of integration with
control rights assigned to A2
“soft information”: the agents know these characteristics when they are informed, but
they cannot convey this information to the principal. Therefore it is impossible for the
principal to sign a complete contract with the agents specifying the effort levels and
projects to be chosen. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), although A1 and A2 cannot
make side agreements ex ante, they may bargain with each other ex post when they
see opportunities for improvement of joint utility. In each division, when one agent
is informed and the other is not, the uninformed party will agree to the informed
party’s favorite because this is better than having no candidate. When both parties are
informed, the party in control can decide whether to choose his favorite project, or can
bargain with the other party. When the agents bargain, the result will be determined
by Nash Bargaining: they choose the project that maximizes their joint payoff, and
split the cooperative surplus equally.
For simplicity and practical relevancy, we assume B  b, B + β1b + β2b >
b +αi B + γ j b always holds for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j. The joint payoff for all three par-
ties cannot be improved when the principal’s favorite project is chosen. The principal
never has incentive to bargain with the agents, even when she is informed, because
there is no cooperative surplus she can gain by doing so.
5 The benchmark case with complete contracting
We first consider the world without contract incompleteness, where the principal P
can use contracts to ensure that her favorite project is chosen for both divisions when
at least one agent is informed (in both divisions, πP = B, π1 = β1b, π2 = β2b). Let
e1, e2 be the efforts exerted by A1 and A2, respectively. The probability that at least
one agent is informed is e1 + e2 − e1e2. The expected social welfare will be twice
the sum of payoffs for all parties (B + β1b + β2b) when the principal’s favorite is
chosen, multiplied by the probability that at least one agent is informed, minus the
cost of searching (g(e1) + g(e2)).
max
e1,e2
2(e1 + e2 − e1e2)(B + β1b + β2b) − (g(e1) + g(e2))
The above equation shows that efforts are selected such that the expected social welfare
is maximized. We use e∗1, e∗2 to denote the level of the agents’ effort when social opti-
mum is achieved. The first order conditions can be written as:
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g′(e∗1) = 2(1 − e∗2)(B + β1b + β2b)
g′(e∗2) = 2(1 − e∗1)(B + β1b + β2b)
These first order conditions imply that the agents choose efforts such that the mar-
ginal cost of searching is equal to the marginal return to all three parties. Applying the




= − B+(β1+β2)bg′′(e∗1) < 0,
∂e∗2
∂e∗1
= − B+(β1+β2)bg′′(e∗2) <
0. Therefore the efforts of the two agents are strategic substitutes. The effort as a
response function of one agent decreases the effort of his counterpart.
If the principal purely maximizes her own payoff, her problem is even simpler:
max
e1,e2
2(e1 + e2 − e1e2)B
As a result she will choose e1 + e2 − e1e2 = 1 ⇔ (1 − e1)(e2 − 1) = 0, which means
that at least one of the agents will exert an effort of 1, and the principal will choose
her favorite project.
6 Incomplete contract without bargaining
We now consider the case in which a complete contract cannot be written either
between the principal and agents, or between the two agents. In the context of our
school of economics example, the dean cannot sign a complete contract with the hir-
ing committee on the choice of candidates. One reason for this incompleteness is that
the quality of candidates is soft information, which cannot be conveyed to or verified
by a third party such as a court. Therefore it is also not possible to sign a contract that
can be enforced by a third party. When complete contracting is not possible, design
of an authoritative structure is the second-best arrangement.
The expected payoff to the agent Ai in the division which he controls will be b when
he is informed (with a probability ei ), and γi b when he is uninformed and the other
agent is informed (with a probability (1 − ei )e j ). The expected payoff to the agent
Ai in the division he does not control will be γi b when the other is informed (with a
probability e j ), and b when he is informed and the other agent is not informed (with a
probability (1 − e j )ei ). We use π li to represent the payoff for the divisions depending
on control rights, superscript l ∈ {1, 2} to represent the controlling party within the
division, and subscript i ∈ {1, 2, P} to represent the party receiving the payoff:
π11 = e1b + (1 − e1)e2γ1b
π21 = e2γ1b + (1 − e2)e1b
π12 = e1γ2b + (1 − e1)e2b
π22 = e2b + (1 − e2)e1γ2b
π1P = e1α1 B + e2(1 − e1)α2 B
π2P = e2α2 B + e1(1 − e2)α1 B
We use S P, I N1, I N2 to represent the three divisional structures: separation, inte-
gration under the control of A1, and integration under the control of A2. Separation
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means that A1 controls only one division. Integration under A1 means that A1 controls
both divisions. The case for A2 is analogous. We use Ki to represent the payoff for
agent i when the divisional structure is K , K ∈ {S P, I N1, I N2}. Their payoffs in
different regimes are as follows:
S P1 = π11 + π21 − g(e1)
S P2 = π12 + π22 − g(e2)
I N11 = 2π11 − g(e1)
I N12 = 2π12 − g(e2)
I N21 = 2π21 − g(e1)
I N21 = 2π22 − g(e2)
The first order conditions for their efforts are:
g′(eS P1 ) = b(2 − eS P2 − γ1eS P2 )
g′(eS P2 ) = b(2 − eS P1 − γ2eS P1 )
g′(eI N11 ) = 2b(1 − γ1eI N12 )
g′(eI N12 ) = 2b(1 − eI N11 )
g′(eI N21 ) = 2b(1 − eI N22 )
g′(eI N22 ) = 2b(1 − γ2eI N21 )
From the monotonicity of function g(e) we can see that ∂ei
∂γi
< 0. The intuition is
that the more one agent can obtain from the other agent’s favorite project, the less
incentivized he is to put in search effort and have his own favorite project selected.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we can easily deduce that the efforts of
agents are strategic substitutes in these situations. An increase in one agent’s effort
invariably discourages the other agent. This result is also very intuitive, given that the
effort of A j has two effects: (1) it increases the opportunity cost for searching for Ai , as
Ai can receive a non-negative payoff by free riding on the information of A j (the free-
riding effect) and (2) when A j is in control, Ai ’s favorite project can be overruled by
A j if A j is informed (the overruling effect). Both effects raise the opportunity cost and
reduce the marginal return on searching for Ai , undermining Ai ’s incentive to search.
The value of the right-hand side of the equations in the first order conditions is usu-
ally between 0 and 2 b, and it is preferred that the solution for their efforts lie between
0 and 1. Without loss of generality, a natural way to normalize this is to assume the
cost function takes the form g(e) = e2b. So we have a linear equation (system) for the
efforts, and the solution is always between 0 and 1. Thus, it is not difficult to arrive at:
eS P1 =
2 − 2γ1




3 − γ1 − γ2 − γ1γ2
eI N11 = 1, eI N12 = 0
eI N21 = 0, eI N22 = 1
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Fig. 2 The Principal’s Payoff under Different Divisional Structures (γ1 = 0.1, γ2 = 0.2, α1 = 0.5). The
horizontal axis is α2. The vertical axis is the payoff for the principal in terms of B. SP represents separation,
IN1 is integration under the control of A1, and IN2 is integration under the control of A2
Here we have an extreme case when divisions are integrated, the agent in control will
have the largest incentive, and exert the maximum level of effort, while the agent
losing control will simply exerts the minimal effort of zero. It is not difficult to prove
that eS P1 , e
S P









eS P2 > e
I N1
2 , the greater one’s control rights, the greater his search effort, other things
equal.
We add a superscript N after the superscript indicating divisional structure to denote




4(1 − γ1)(2 − γ1 − γ1γ2)α1 + 4(1 − γ2)(2 − γ2 − γ1γ2)α2
(3 − γ1 − γ2 − γ1γ2) B

I N1,N
P = 2α1 B

I N2,N
P = 2α2 B
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When there is no room for bargaining between agents, the payoff for
the principal is always larger under integration than under separation.
The proof for the proposition can be found in Appendix 1.
From this proposition we know that the principal will always choose integration
rather than separation, provided that there is no ex post bargaining between the agents.
An illustrative figure can be found below whereγ1 = 0.1, γ2 = 0.2.We letα1 = 0.5
so that I N1P is normalized to B (Fig. 2).
We can see that the payoff for the principal under separation is always lower than
the maximum payoff under integration; thus separation cannot be optimal when bar-
gaining is not possible.
7 Incomplete contract with bargaining
More realistically, agents in an organization will try to maximize and split the joint
surplus when such opportunities arise ex post. We now introduce an ex post bargaining
phase into the model à la Grossman and Hart (1986). The process of bargaining is as
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follows: (1) the default payoff is determined by the payoff generated by the control-
ling party’s favorite; (2) instead of choosing his own favorite, the controlling party
proposes to the other party that he choose a candidate who maximizes the joint payoff
of both parties; (3) the parties Nash bargain and split the cooperative surplus equally.
Let the project that maximizes the joint payoff be project k. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that b1k + b2k = (1 + γ3)b, γ3 ∈ [0, 1], γ3 ≥ max(γ1, γ2).
Moreover, we assume that γ3 is not very large, and γ3 ≤ min(3γ1, γ1 + 2γ2) in order
to have a reasonable analytical solution for efforts. Here bargaining is always bene-
ficial to both parties; thus they will always bargain provided that both of them have
searched and become informed.
We assume that this project generates an expected payoff of α3 B to the principal,
where α3 is another parameter of interest congruence between 0 and 1, and will be
derived analytically later for the symmetric case. α3 can be larger or smaller than
α1, α2. Let the subscript h be the notation for the controlling party. We say that bar-
gaining is interest congruence-enhancing if α3 is larger than αh, and interest congru-
ence-destructing if α3 is smaller than αh . Here we can contextualize α3 again in our
school of economics story: suppose that there is integration under the control of the
macroeconomics professor. The macro professor can hire two “pure macro” candi-
dates. But he can also hire a candidate engaged in crossover research between micro
and macroeconomics, and ask the microeconomics professor to transfer some benefit
to him in return for the compromise. This crossover candidate is a favorable choice for
both professors, enabling him to be selected through bargaining. If crossover research
is more valuable to the dean than either pure macro or pure micro research, the bar-
gaining will be more aligned with her interests, and if the dean prefers pure macro or
micro research, bargaining may be unfavorable to her.
The expected payoff to the agent Ai in the division he controls will be b when he is
informed (with a probability ei (1−e j )), b+ 12 (γ3−γ j )b when both are informed (with
a probability ei e j ) and γi b when he is uninformed and the other agent is informed
(with a probability (1−ei )e j ). The expected payoff to the agent Ai in the division that
he does not control will be γi b when he is uninformed and the other agent is informed
(with a probability e j (1 − ei )), γi b + 12 (γ3 − γi )b when both are informed (with a
probability ei e j ) and b when he is informed and the other agent is not informed (with
a probability (1−e j )ei ). We use π li to represent the payoff in each division depending
on the control right, superscript l ∈ {1, 2} to represent the controlling party in the
division, and subscript i ∈ {1, 2, P} to represent who is receiving the payoff:
π11 = e1(1 − e2)b + e1e2
(




+ e2(1 − e1)γ1b
π12 = e1(1 − e2)γ2b + e1e2
(
γ2b + γ3 − γ22 b
)
+ e2(1 − e1)b
π21 = e2(1 − e1)γ1b + e1e2
(
γ1b + γ3 − γ12 b
)
+ e1(1 − e2)b
π22 = e2(1 − e1)b + e1e2
(




+ e1(1 − e2)γ2b
π1P = π2P = e1(1 − e2)α1 B + e1e2α3 B + e2(1 − e1)α2 B
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The first order conditions for the optimal effort level in different divisional structures
are:
g′(eS P1 ) = 2
(





g′(eS P2 ) = 2
(





g′(eI N11 ) = 2
(





g′(eI N12 ) = 2
(





g′(eI N21 ) = 2
(





g′(eI N22 ) = 2
(





Using the monotonicity of function g(e) and the implicit function theorem again, it is




< 0. The agents have less incentive to search if
they can accrue greater benefit by free riding on the effort of others. They have greater
incentive to search if bargaining can generate greater benefit. The efforts by agents
are strategic substitutes under separation, but they can be either substitutes or com-
plements under integration. On top of the free-riding effect and overruling effect we
discussed in the last section, when bargaining can generate significant joint surplus,
one agent can be encouraged to search more in order to increase his bargaining power
vis-à-vis the other agent, particularly when he sees the other agent engaged in search.
In other words, search is complementary to separation.
Imposing g(e) = e2b, we can solve for:
eS P1 =
8 − 12γ1 − 4γ2 + 8γ3
16 − (2 + 3γ1 + γ2 − 2γ3)(2 + γ1 + 3γ2 − 2γ3)
eS P2 =
8 − 4γ1 − 12γ2 + 8γ3
16 − (2 + 3γ1 + γ2 − 2γ3)(2 + γ1 + 3γ2 − 2γ3)
eI N11 =
2 − 2γ1 − γ2 + γ3
2 − (2 + γ2 − γ3)(2γ1 + γ2 − γ3)
eI N12 =
γ3 − γ2
2 − (2 + γ2 − γ3)(2γ1 + γ2 − γ3)
eI N21 =
γ3 − γ1
2 − (2 + γ1 − γ3)(γ1 + 2γ2 − γ3)
eI N22 =
2 − γ1 − 2γ2 + γ3
2 − (2 + γ1 − γ3)(γ1 + 2γ2 − γ3)
All the solutions above are between 0 and 1. A detailed proof can be found in Mathe-
matical Appendix 2. From simple calculation we can also see that: eI N11 − eI N12 > 0,
eI N22 − eI N21 > 0.
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We add a superscript B after the superscript indicating divisional structure to denote
that this case contains bargaining. The principal’s payoffs in these cases are as follows:

S P,B
P = [eS P1 (1 − eS P2 )α1 + eS P1 eS P2 α3 + eS P2 (1 − eS P1 )α2]B

I N1,B
P = [eI N11 (1 − eI N12 )α1 + eI N11 eI N12 α3 + eI N12 (1 − eI N11 )α2]B

I N2,B
P = [eI N21 (1 − eI N22 )α1 + eI N21 eI N22 α3 + eI N22 (1 − eI N21 )α2]B
Intuitively, the difference between the incentives of agents should be smaller under
separation than under integration. Therefore the product of their efforts (e1e2)





P ) when α3 is very large. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When there is ex post bargaining, it may be optimal for the prin-
cipal to choose internal separation when the types of projects agreed upon by the
agents are generally favorable to her. When the two agents are completely symmetri-
cal (γ1 = γ2 = γ, α1 = α2 = α), and the interest congruence-enhancing effect of
bargaining is large enough (α3 is larger than a cutoff value, which is a function of α),
the principal should always choose separation over integration.
The proof of Proposition 2 for the symmetric case can be found in Appendix 3. For
the general (non-symmetrical) case, we give a graphic illustration. Having tried many
parameter settings, we find that there are generally regions where each scheme is opti-
mal. Below is the figure for the case where α1 = 0.5, γ1 = 0.1, γ2 = 0.2, γ3 = 0.3
(Fig. 3).
Separation is optimal when neither A1 nor A2 is very productive, and bargaining
can promote the interest congruence between the principal and the agents. Integration
is optimal when one agent is much more productive than the other: As a high-powered
incentive, control should be assigned to the more productive agent.
These results show that bargaining has a very important impact on the optimal
divisional structure that the principal should choose. However, we must also take into
account the possibility that if agents tend to agree on some project deemed unfavor-
able by the principal, the principal would have an incentive to detect and forbid private
bargaining.
For the symmetrical case we can prove that there is a cutoff value α˜3, which is a
function of α, for α3 > α˜3,S P,BP > 
I N ,B
P always holds.3 The mathematical details
are located in Appendix 3. It is not difficult to imagine that if the principal sufficiently
likes the projects chosen through bargaining, she should always choose separation
over integration.
8 Concluding remarks
When complete contracting is not possible, allocation of authority becomes the sec-
ond-best arrangement. This paper shows how incomplete contracts affect the decision
of whether to use either internal integration or separation. Paralleling the seminal
3 For example, when γ = 0.5, γ3 = 0.8,S P,BP > I N ,BP always holds when α3 > 1.4240α.
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Fig. 3 The optimal divisional structure with bargaining. The horizontal axis is the scale of α2, and the
vertical axis is the scale of α3
work of Grossman and Hart (1986) on external boundaries, we find that control rights
constitute a very important source of incentives within an organization, and divisional
structure plays a fundamental role in determining incentives for agents. We find that
when bargaining is not possible, it is always better for the principal to adopt integration
and assign the control rights to the most productive agent. When bargaining is possible,
formal divisional structure defines the relative ex post bargaining positions of the two
agents and, consequently, their incentive to search ex ante. The principal may want to
adopt separation when the agents generally agree through bargaining on a project she
deems more favorable. The reason is that both agents need to be informed in order to
bargain, and therefore bargaining is more likely when the two agents have symmetrical
incentives (separation); while one agent’s incentive to search will be undermined in
an integrated setting. The principal may optimally prohibit bargaining if the agents
tend to agree on projects she finds unfavorable.
The principal plays an independent role in the allocation of control rights in this
paper, as distinguished from the previous literature. First, the principal in our work
is not a “searching (productive) principal” as in Aghion and Tirole (1997), since she
does not search, and therefore does not decide upon each specific project. We restrict
our focus to the principal’s decision on the divisional structure, and leave out her
role in the direct production process. This assumption can be applied to a number of
real-life scenarios. For instance, it is not necessary for the president of a hospital to
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treat numerous patients daily, or the president of a university to conduct research. It is
more important for them to make decisions at the general management level, allocate
control, and choose the optimal divisional structure to maximize the organization’s
efficiency. Secondly, she is not a “bargaining principal” as in the models focusing
on the principal’s choice between in-house production and out-sourcing (Hart et al.
1997). The principal in our model does not bargain directly with her agents, but is able
to determine the bargaining powers of the agents.
We are aware that in the complete contracting literature, there is research comparing
the efficiency of contracts under three kinds of organizational structures: separation,
integration and nested departments (Baron and Besanko 1992; Melumad et al. 1995;
Mookherjee and Tsumagari 2004; Severinov 2008). It should be noted that “sepa-
ration” in the complete and incomplete contract situations has the same meaning,
but the “integration” in this paper is more akin to the “nested departments” or “sub-
contracting” in the complete contract settings. “Integration” is used in the complete
contract literature only for cases in which departments are merged: one agent is made
manager while the other agent is eliminated from the management process. The com-
plete contract approach proffers different predictions from the incomplete contract
approach, and therefore it may be interesting to test their predictions through labora-
tory experimentation, as was done by Fehr et al. (2010). It would be also interesting
to study the interplay of richer organizational structures and bargaining protocols and
its implications for optimal organizational design.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
We can demonstrate this through a straightforward calculation:
Because eS P1 , e
S P
2 ∈ [0, 12 ],S P,NP = [eS P1 α1 + (1 − eS P1 )eS P2 α2 + eS P2 α2 + (1 −
eS P2 )e
S P
1 α1]B ≤ 2[eS P1 α1 + eS P2 α2]B ≤ (α1 + α2)B ≤ max(2α1 B, 2α2 B).










2 ∈ [0, 1]
From the first order conditions and g(e) = e2b, we have:
eS P1 = 1 −
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eS P2 = 1 −
2 + γ1 + 3γ2 − 2γ3
4
eS P1
eI N11 = 1 −
(
γ1 + γ2 − γ32
)
eI N12
eI N12 = 1 −
(




eI N21 = 1 −
(




eI N22 = 1 −
(
γ2 + γ1 − γ32
)
eI N21
Let: φ = 2+3γ1+γ2−2γ34 , ϕ = 2+γ1+3γ2−2γ34 , ρ = γ1 + γ2−γ32 , σ = 1 + γ2−γ32 , λ =
1 + γ1−γ32 , μ = γ2 + γ1−γ32 . From the condition γ3 ≤ min(3γ1, γ1 + 2γ2), we know
φ, ϕ, ρ, σ, λ, μ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the solution can be rewritten as:
eS P1 =
1 − φ



















We can see that both the numerator and the denominator are positive, and the
numerator cannot be larger than the denominator, so these effort levels are between
0 and 1.
Appendix 3: Proof of the symmetric case for Proposition 2
When γ1 = γ2 = γ, α1 = α2 = α:
eS P1 = eS P2 =
0.5 − γ + 0.5γ3
1 − (0.5 + γ − 0.5γ3)2
eI N11 = eI N22 =
0.5 − γ + 0.5γ3
1 − (1 + 0.5γ − 0.5γ3)(1.5γ − 0.5γ3)
eI N12 = eI N22 =
0.5γ3 + 0.5γ1
1 − (1 + 0.5γ − 0.5γ3)(1.5γ − 0.5γ3)

S P,B
P = 2eS P1 (1 − eS P2 )αB + eS P1 eS P2 α3 B

I N1,B
P = I N2,BP = I N ,BP = (eI N11 + eI N12 − 2eI N11 eI N12 )αB + eI N11 eI N12 α3 B
Based on the proof (0.5 + γ − 0.5γ3)2 ≥ (1 + 0.5γ − 0.5γ3)(1.5γ − 0.5γ3), it can
be concluded that eS P1 + eS P2 ≥ eI N11 + eI N12 , eS P1 eS P2 ≥ eI N11 eI N12 . Therefore there







96 T. Bao, Y. Wang
References
Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and real authority in organizations. J Polit Econ 105(1):1–29
Argyres N (1995) Technology strategy, governance structure and interdivisional coordination. J Econ Behav
Organ 28(3):337–358
Baron D, Besanko D (1992) Information, control, and organizational structure. J Econ Manag Strateg
1(2):237–275
Bolton P, Dewatripont M (1994) The firm as a communication network. Q J Econ 109(4):809–839
Dessein W (2002) Authority and communication in organizations. Rev Econ Stud 69(4):811–838
Dessein W, Santos T (2006) Adaptive organizations. J Polit Econ 114(5):956–995
Fehr E, Herz H, Wilkening T (2010) The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power.
University of Zurich, Mimeo
Grossman S, Hart O (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral ownership.
J Polit Econ 94(4):691–719
Hart O, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1997) The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons.
Q J Econ 112(4):1127–1161
Maskin E, Qian Y, Xu C (2000) Incentives, information, and organizational form. Rev Econ Stud
67(2):359–378
Melumad N, Mookherjee D, Reichelstein S (1995) Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts.
RAND J Econ 26(4):654–672
Milgrom P, Roberts J (1992) Economics, Organization, and Management. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Mookherjee D (2006) Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: a mechanism design perspective. J Econ
Lit 44(2):367–390
Mookherjee D, Tsumagari M (2004) The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and inter-
mediation. Econometrica 72(4):1179–1219
Poitevin M (1995) Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design. Northwestern University, Mimeo
Puschke K (2009) Task assignment and organizational form. J Econ 96(2):149–168
Qian Y, Roland G, Xu C (1999) Why China’s different from east Europe? perspectives from organizational
theory. Eur Econ Rev 43(46):1084–1094
Riyanto YE (2000) Delegation of Authority, Managerial Initiatives, and the Design of Divisional Structure.
University of Groningen, Mimeo
Rotemberg J, Saloner G (1993) Leadership style and incentives. Manag Sci 39(11):1299–1318
Severinov S (2008) The value of information and optimal organization. RAND J Econ 39(1):238–265
van Zandt T (1999) Real-time decentralized information processing as a model of organizations with bound-
edly rational agents. Rev Econ Stud 66(3):633–658
123
